By Captain Daniel Morgan
Editor’s Note: Captain Morgan is former commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
I have spent eleven months in Iraq fighting this war as a company commander, starting from the berm in Kuwait to Mosul, Iraq. My soldiers and I have learned a tremendous amount of lessons, shared many successes, and witnessed horrific injuries on our fellow soldiers. We never failed to conduct an AAR or hotwash after an operation, despite the success, failure or casualties. I want to share some TTPs and SOPs with as many as possible because this fight ebbs and flows with short, shocking violence that “always being prepared” becomes more than just a cliché. You will never know when you will be attacked — it just happens.
An explosion rocks the vehicle in front of you, throwing soldiers onto the street. You see the vehicle rise up onto two wheels before settling and rolling to a stop. AK-47 fire and RPGs are heard almost simultaneously. Your soldiers stagger about trying to shake off the effects of the concussion. Some fire wildly in different directions because the cracking of the AK-47s are echoing off the buildings, so you cannot pinpoint the direction of fire. The battle drill says to clear the kill zone, but you have competing priorities. First, you have casualties that need to be secured, assessed and stabilized. Second, if you run, you won’t kill the enemy or deter them. You must fight back and hopefully kill them. Do you stay in the kill zone and fight?
This happened to my soldiers and me. Sadly, this has happened to my company and me on several occasions in various forms. On this day, I lost a platoon sergeant and it was a devastating experience to many soldiers. He is alive but when I got to that truck he was a pile of blood and matter. His leg was completely blown off with shrapnel wounds all over him. He stayed there as we secured everything, trying to still lead his soldiers. We fought back that day, killing one suspected enemy and detaining two more. This reaction occurred due to rehearsals, AARs, aggressive leadership at every level, and discipline.
A hunch tells me that not much will change for months or a couple of years in how we do daily business in Iraq. Operations will be basically broken down into four areas. First, you need to clear Main Supply Routes (MSRs) of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Second, platoons will conduct cordon and searches against a neighborhood, store, market or house. Third, units will conduct patrols to provide a presence in an area, enhancing security. Finally, units will conduct civil-military operations simultaneously with the first three operations. These operations require patrolling in an urban environment, mounted and dismounted, leaving you vulnerable.
You must always be on the offensive. You cannot assume that you are on a security presence patrol. It is always a movement to contact. Company commanders must plan every patrol in this mindset and give specified tasks that accomplish the overall mission. For example, if you are going to conduct a patrol down a heavily congested market street in order to distribute information, treat it as a movement to contact and be on the offensive. Give a subordinate unit the task to distribute newsletters or flyers and use the remaining elements to provide security — ready to fight. This offensive spirit increases force protection and prepares you to gain the initiative immediately upon contact.
I hope to provide leaders who come to Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere else in the future some ideas for training and preparing to fight in this environment. This environment consists of two factors — urban fighting and civil-military operations. The fight at the company level requires both skills and capabilities. Many factors are out of your control and many assets needed for Stability and Support Operations (SASO) are not part of your division or brigade force structure, much less battalion. So, you must control what you can and that is urban patrolling, force protection, company level information operations, and home station training.
Urban Patrolling
The more the terrorist succeeds in wounding or killing US soldiers, the more he is emboldened to do it again. You must instill in your soldiers that we will fight back into the ambush. 99% of the time you already have fire superiority, so use it immediately. Train your soldiers to be scanning rooftops, looking across open fields (the enemy wants some stand off and the ability to run), and providing overwatch at every moment. These three factors are key whether you are conducting mounted or dismounted patrols. You must do a patrol brief every time you depart the gate and never cease communicating and cross-talking between each other.
The most important part of the urban patrol is the threat environment. The congestion and overpopulation in these areas endanger any US patrol at any time. If you lack the number of boots on the ground, you could find yourself in a predicament where you get overwhelmed by an angry mob. For example, you are leading a three-vehicle convoy in the city center with just a squad and three enemy insurgents attack with AK-47s. You return effective fire, killing or wounding the attackers. You dismount and secure the area. However, your return fire upset many citizens and now you are surrounded. This is the dilemma. You can never take a patrol for granted.
The urban patrol, dismounted or mounted, must have sufficient boots on the ground to secure a casualty, set up an overwatch/support by fire position, and maneuver. The challenge to this patrol is that, depending on the direction of the attack against you and where in your patrol you were attacked, every element must be prepared to assume each role. Leaders must establish standard formations with sectors of fire. If mounted, face out 360 degrees (do not have the soldiers twist to look over their soldiers — - see vehicle preparation), ensure soldiers alternate high-low in their sectors, and always attack into the enemy to kill or capture them.
Patrols for Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) require boots on the ground. A mounted patrol for IEDs limits the ability to identify a potential IED and provides a likely target since the vehicles travel slowly. The vehicles can trail the patrol to provide rapid response if needed. The purpose is to identify an IED to eliminate any target for the enemy and destroy the IED in place. The IED patrol focuses on Main Supply Routes (MSR), avenues of approach in and out of battalion and company command posts, and LOGPAC routes. These three routes must be cleared prior to any movement, demonstrating the importance of the IED patrol for a company.
IED patrols require dismounted soldiers with the lead team using binoculars, spotting scopes, or some type of magnified observation device. During limited visibility hours, you will need high powered, hand-held spotlights. Your lead clearing elements must have interlocking fields of observation and never hesitate to halt the patrol upon anything suspicious. The trail teams must first provide overwatch, so the lead teams can effectively search for IEDs. The trail team’s secondary task is to maneuver against enemy forces and/or cordon the area. You must rehearse this patrol because it is paramount to saving lives.
Routine dismounted patrols must be conducted in sector, despite the risks a commander may have in its execution. A mounted patrol through sector fails to provide adequate presence and does not lend itself to winning the hearts and minds of the local population. The best way to mitigate the risk is more boots on the ground, meaning never patrol dismounted with less than a platoon. The dismounted patrol requires intense observation and readiness. Vehicles must be prepared to reinforce the patrol for an attack or exfiltration. These patrols must be conducted two to three times a week during specific times of the day to secure the environment and promote unity and cooperation in sector.
The dismounted patrol must have a purpose more than a presence. Platoon and squad leaders must engage storeowners, bystanders, and others to gather information. This patrol provides the best means to a stable, cooperative company sector. Nevertheless, security precautions must be taken to protect the troops. First, three-dimensional observation must be maintained continuously. Second, communication between leaders, vehicles, and the company CP cannot be overlooked — higher needs to know where you are! Third, treat it as a movement to contact even though you are out talking to the people. At any time, a grenade will come from the rooftops and you must go after them with violence of action and speed.
Leaders must be prepared to react to contact from any direction — left, right, front, rear, or above. The urban area lends itself to distraction — pretty girls, vendors selling soda or ice cream, vehicle traffic, large crowds around vendors, etc. In this threat environment, the enemy will choose the time, place, and type of attack. The enemy will run after a brief attack. It is up to you to react quick enough to kill or capture them. Leaders must immediately maneuver against the enemy, while simultaneously isolating the area and providing overwatch for the maneuver force or any casualties. Let the leader pull you back if he needs the forces to conduct casualty evacuation.
The mounted patrol occurs everyday, whether conducting a dismounted patrol out in sector or attending a meeting with local officials. The mounted patrol requires constant vigilance by every soldier. Leaders must have a SOP upon contact. If you want to prevent attacks, then, if the situation permits, you dismount and fight or maneuver. Again, the course of action depends on the number of boots on the ground. If you are in a three-vehicle convoy with three soldiers per vehicle and you are attacked and receive casualties, you probably will clear the kill zone and call in the location and contact report. However, the more you withdraw and not fight back, the more they will attack. In boldness, lies safety.
I adopted a SOP called the Button Hook, which is derived from how a unit attempts to capture or kill a sniper. A mounted patrol receives enemy machine gun fire and RPGs. The “Button Hook” calls for the immediate cordon of the suspected area by surrounding the block with its vehicles, sealing off possible enemy escape routes. The convoy commander simultaneously calls for OH-58D Kiowas to reinforce the cordon and to identify escaping personnel or suspected vehicles. If the convoy commander has the forces, he begins to clear the area from the most likely target to the least likely target. If he lacks the forces, he maintains the cordon and calls for the QRF infantry. This course of action will lead to the capture of the attackers or to some information.
Soldiers cannot afford to relax during mounted patrols. In a four-vehicle patrol, the leader leads the convoy. The second truck maintains a mounted crew-served machine gun, as does the trail vehicle. The third vehicle can vary in its composition and purpose. The lead vehicle sets the speed and path of the convoy. His main purpose is navigation and searching for possible IEDs. When passing under bridges, gunners must observe the approach and then the departure on the other side of the bridge. Everyone has a purpose and everyone must know what to do upon contact.
The lead truck has a challenge as it navigates through the city. This is a leader’s responsibility and should not be delegated. For example, I was leading a convoy in the evening hours — a popular time for ambushes and IEDs. As we approached a vehicle with a driver inside, I saw him on a phone through his rear window. He spoke on the phone and drove away before we passed him. I immediately changed our route by taking a right through a neighborhood, avoiding the intersection. I do not know if we avoided a possible IED ambush or not, but it is better to suppose that this car and its driver were an early warning for an ambush.
Enemy forces emplace IEDs at key intersections, where our vehicles slow down and get closer to one another. The lead vehicle needs to surround the convoy with civilian vehicles and allow other vehicles in between their convoy. This tactic disrupts the enemy as he tries to target the convoy. In addition, speed of travel is an ally here. Leaders must balance speed and safety in their travels. The last thing that needs to happen is we run over Iraqi pedestrians and vehicles, or flip one of our own. However, it is harder to attack a convoy, if it is moving at a high rate of speed.
Leaders have TTPs in how to avoid IEDs and possible kill zones, but some areas are inevitable. For example, as I lead convoys into an intersection where we will turn right, my RTO moves the vehicle as far left as possible. On turns, most IEDs, if not all, are placed on the inside turn. This left position as we turn right increases space between us and a possible IED. In addition, since we are turning right, I can observe and clear the left side of the road and curb of possible IEDs. I cannot see the right side until it would be too late. As we enter the turn, my RTO observes the traffic and we pick up speed, like a slingshot into traffic. Wide, fast turns protect the force.
Lastly, units will conduct hundreds of cordon and searches — all different with varying degrees of aggressiveness on entry. These operations emerge from human intelligence against a specific target or during a “neighborhood surge,” meaning soldiers flood an area to search homes with or without permission. The level of aggression will be determined by your command. Basic task organization still applies as every leader learns in military schools. However, units can NEVER fail to isolate a target. Isolation of an objective must be paramount in planning these operations, especially in this urban environment.
Urban environments present so many threats, ranging from rooftop shootings and drive-by shootings to civil unrest against the cordon and search. Leaders must isolate the objective and sub-objectives throughout the entire cordon and search operation. Isolation does not stop at the block the house is located. It goes from there to the house to the front door and into each room in the house. Isolating each portion of the objective protects your soldiers and allows you to react to any contingency that may arise during a search. Isolation requires more forces, but it facilitates a smooth operation by reducing distractions and threats to your soldiers.
Home Station Training
You must train your soldiers in battle drills and take the necessary preparations prior to your arrival. We learned as we went along day-by-day. AARs and hotwashes every time are key to success, but training at home station or in an ISB greatly improve your chances for success and survival. Second, units must prepare their vehicles for patrols and force protection in static positions. Third, everyone needs to critique themselves and the unit to refine and improve their actions on the battlefield.
Actual training for this threat environment remains fairly standard — minus certain non-standard situations not found in many MTPs. The urban environment in Iraq can be replicated at any military post urban training site. I would focus on four aspects in training: 1) Marksmanship; 2) CASEVAC, including aerial; 3) Enter and Clear a Building and Room; and 4) React to Contact from a vehicle, a non-standard task and dismounted. Each of these training areas must be graduated in difficulty and in an urban threat environment. A unit that trains on these areas with an unrelenting focus and discipline will succeed in this environment.
Marksmanship is the core of excellence for an infantry soldier. Their proficiency in killing wins the battle. The more you suppress a target here without killing or wounding the enemy, the bolder he becomes in attacking you. You need to train your soldiers to aim, fire, and kill. If an enemy opens fire with an AK-47 aimlessly, which most of these people do, you should be able to calmly place the red dot reticule of your M-68 optic device on his chest and kill him with one shot. If you do this, the rest will run and probably not come back. This skill takes training, patience, and sadly, experience.
Units must familiarize themselves with every weapon system in a battalion. Soldiers must know how to load, fire, clear, and reduce stoppages and misfires of every crew served weapon. In combat, due to personnel changeovers, a soldier may be behind a mounted .50 caliber machine gun or M240 machine gun at any given time. He does not need to be qualified, but he needs to know how to operate the weapon. Units must set up concurrent training at every range, utilizing training on every weapon. Leaders should also familiarize their soldiers with hands-on training with foreign weapons, including AK-47s, RPKs, RPG launchers and warheads, and PKMs. Soldiers will deal with these weapons daily.
Soldiers need reflexive and quick fire training, using burst fire. Do not ignore 9mm, M249 Squad Automatic Weapons, and shotguns. This training is the most practical aspect to succeeding in this urban combat. As the soldier’s proficiency increases, leaders need to reduce target exposure on computerized ranges. Enemy insurgents fire from rooftops and then hide, popping up and down. Second, practice weak side shooting and tactical magazine changes on the reflexive firing range. Third, conduct a terminal effects demonstration on engine blocks, vehicle doors, concrete, and various materials, using FM 3-06.11 as a guide. This training will help leaders choose the right weapon system and facilitate decision-making in combat. Lastly, let your soldiers move around on the range — from the zero range to the qualification range — with loaded weapons, allowing the reinforcement of muzzle awareness and safety.
Casualty evacuation requires training at every level. First, do not let a casualty take your focus away from a combat engagement. You must remember that your purpose is to fight and win. Let your First Sergeant guide and direct CASEVAC. Leaders need to train casualty evacuation for three purposes. First, combat medics must train under the most realistic scenarios possible, using simulation and degrading symptoms. Many technologies exist in this area — find them and use them. Second, integrate casualties into everything, but with a focus on maintaining the fight against the enemy. Third, train every soldier in making assessments in casualty priority, placing a tourniquet, and calling in a four-line MEDEVAC.
Combat medics are a saving grace and will become your favorite and most-valued soldier. Unfortunately, the ratio between missions and medics is skewed, requiring training at the individual soldier level. Combat lifesavers must be maximized by the battalion, and do not forget your Support Platoon — who will drive more than anyone else in the battalion. Supply your medics with four tourniquets each and each soldier with one tourniquet. We use a mini-ratchet strap that is 1” wide and long enough to wrap around the thigh of a soldier. It is the most rapid means to saving a soldier from blood loss. Trust me, it saved four of my soldiers’ lives, not counting another dozen in the battalion.
Mounted react to contact drills are a necessity in urban contact. Units will move to and from many locations for missions, finding themselves more vulnerable on a vehicle. Leaders must focus on three areas in this training. First, soldiers must maintain 360-degree security and alternate high-low. Second, leaders cannot forget dismount drills upon contact. Lastly, although never really accurate, soldiers must train on mounted firing while moving. These three areas are key to success in a mounted react to contact. Leaders must also consider the placement of their mounted weapons in their convoy. Remember, the heavy weapons do no good if they are in the front of your convoy.
Company Civil-Military and Information Operations
This topic deserves serious attention from our senior leaders. I feel we lack the experience, training and resources at the brigade level and down. We need to implement this facet of full spectrum operations more into our Army education system and equip the “boots on the ground” soldiers with the capabilities. Nevertheless, these shortcomings do not give an excuse for a lack of company efforts in information and civil-military operations. Creativity and initiative by company commanders make the difference.
Civil-military and information operations (CMO/IO) are not mutually exclusive. Commanders must take personal responsibility of these efforts. CMO/IO reinforce the success of each undertaking. The more successful CMO is in your sector, the more positive your IO will be for you. Brigade prioritizes CMO at the company level, meaning you are directed to focus on certain projects for the community. These projects will vary from schools, utilities, sanitation, and reconstruction. IO, however, provides a company commander an opportunity to take control of his sector, earning the respect of local officials and citizens.
Information operations are simple at the company level. IO has two purposes. First, you must distribute information to the people. Uninformed citizens in a country we just subjugated in war have the potential to demonstrate and possibly riot. You must inform them of your goals and actions. Second, IO involves not only passing out information, it requires the collection of information. The development of an informed populace and involvement of community leaders by a commander leads to information about hostile threats and benevolent projects.
The first step in CMO/IO is to identify in priority areas to be funded for CMO. Simultaneously, commanders need situational understanding of the mindset of the sector. There are many TTPs that help in accomplishing this assessment. First, commanders need to determine who can help them. I broke my focal groups into business, education, political, and religious. Since we were the first forces into Mosul, Iraq, my soldiers and I had to get out into the streets and meet people. We developed a “list of influence” and began developing relationships.
On 13 September 2003, one of my platoons was ambushed, wounding three of my soldiers. The platoon was ambushed in a congested urban area with narrow alleys. After linking up with the platoon and conducting an aerial medical evacuation, a member of an Iraqi political party called me and said he saw the ambush and knew the attackers. The attackers were not home, but these men watched the houses of the attackers for 48 hours. They called me at 0200 to inform me they were home. The brigade commander gave us approval to conduct a cordon and search. We infiltrated the neighborhood, linked up with our “informants,” and grabbed the attacker. This ambush cost the leg of one of my soldiers and through relationships we caught the culprit.
Leaders must understand the environment prior to committing blindly to some CMO plan. I had no true understanding of the mindset of the citizens in my sector. In addition, there were no performance measures of effectiveness to determine any success we were having in our efforts. Consequently, I developed a survey of attitudes and needs in Arabic that was common across all my sub-sectors. My soldiers hated this at first, but in the end we saw where we needed to be and what we needed to do. This situational understanding is vital to CMO/IO. Performance measures of effectiveness prevent wasted efforts, allocate resources efficiently, and focus your company on valid, verifiable priorities.
Force Protection
Force protection must remain on the forefront of every leader’s mind. Protecting your soldiers requires a tough balance between the safety of your soldiers and mission necessity. Many times in this environment leaders will avoid missions in order to protect soldiers. This bad habit is not force protection. We protect soldiers to maintain combat power for mission accomplishment and to bring them home. Force protection has been alluded to throughout this discussion, but two areas demand specific attention — vehicle preparation and compound security.
Vehicle preparation prior to arrival in theater saves lives. As the first combat unit to assume mission in Mosul, we had to learn the hard way. Vehicles must be prepared in a manner that protects the soldiers from shrapnel and rifle/machine gunfire. A tough decision must be made with respect to sandbags in the trucks. The M998 HMMWV will experience thousands of miles. The weight of a combat-loaded infantry squad with over 50 sandbags will deteriorate a M998 quickly. The sandbags will save the lives of soldiers, but they do not protect the M998.
Armor plating along the doors of the drivers and passengers and along the benches in the back of the M998 protect soldiers. On December 26, 2003, we were ambushed while clearing an intersection of IEDs. After one explosion and a fusillade of fire from two enemy machine guns, we inspected the trucks and found that the armor plating on the doors and back of the M998 had withstood the explosion and machine gun impacts, saving the lives of over 10 soldiers. The armor plating must withstand 7.62mm at a minimum. Get it on your trucks as soon as possible.
Security is timeless in military operations. During mounted movements in an urban environment, vehicles must have three-dimensional security. Threats can come from anywhere at anytime. Leaders must prepare their vehicles to facilitate 360-degree security. We placed benches inside every HMMWV and LMTV. I do not know if we were the first ones to do this, but we did recognize this early on, due to AAR comments by soldiers. An RPG will hit you so fast that if soldiers are not in the proper security position, you may never know the origin of fire. Simple wooden benches so soldiers can sit back-to-back improve security, increase offensive capabilities, and enable units to gain the initiative quickly.
Static compound security remains ever-present on the battlefield. Commanders need to balance mission requirements with protecting their company command post or battalion TOC. Every compound will be on a road so vehicles can gain access. Some locations permit you to shut down all civilian traffic and some areas will not allow this isolation. The difference in successful or “just-surviving” compound security is the active versus passive measures taken by a unit.
Enemy forces conducted numerous drive-by shootings against a particular unit. The enemy avenue of approach was from only two locations on the same road. The unit could not shut down the road for an indefinite period of time so the commander was limited in his options. He could emplace two checkpoints at either end of the road, which would require another platoon, or he could emplace ambushes at either end of the road during the times of past drive-by shootings. If he chose the checkpoint course of action, he remained passive and lost another maneuver platoon to static security, reducing his flexibility and presence in sector. He chose the ambush option and ended up killing enemy forces and destroying their vehicles. In the end, the drive-by shootings decreased dramatically in this area.
Static security in an urban area requires a presence outside of the walled compound. Commanders need to dispatch patrols during varying times, not only to clear IEDs, but to clear unoccupied buildings, search for fighting positions, occupy OPs, etc. Active, aggressive methods to push your security blanket farther out than your walled compound protects your soldiers, allowing them to rest and plan comfortably. Commanders must implement a combination of active and passive measures to isolate their company compound as much as possible.
Conclusion
American soldiers are facing men with a cell phone is one hand, a RPG in the other, and ill-conceived hatred in their heart. This enemy is asymmetric in the most unpredictable way. US forces will face this threat for months in Iraq, if not years. Technology only enhances the soldiers’ capabilities to kill the enemy and win their hearts and minds simultaneously. In the end, US soldiers must meet the enemy — specifically terrorists — face-to-face, hand-to-hand and kill them. Company commanders must bring to bear creativity, aggressiveness, and an offensive spirit to take away the enemy’s will. In the end, gather information on enemy targets and then narrowly target them with overwhelming combat power.
Throughout this conflict, I discovered that most things taught in Army schools remain valid and worth remembering during my decision-making process. The most important factors that were reinforced to me that applies to everything discussed here is the necessity to conduct combat AARs after every patrol, whether there was contact or not. Second, Troop Leading Procedures are vital, especially conducting a reconnaissance, rehearsals and building a terrain model, and supervising platoon and leader operation orders and rehearsals. Third, and most important, maintain an offensive spirit always. Look for the enemy to shoot at you, shoot back and kill or capture them. Bold leaders are dangerous and that is what you want in them as they fight this fight.
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